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October 31, 2002 - Brad Wenban
Kenny,
A player with 3 straight .320 seasons could be a .320 hitter in actuality. In fact, he could be a .350 hitter that got unlucky.
We know that baseball talent roughly follows the normal distribution. One thing this means is that (thinking graphically) for any player who has a true talent of distance X from the mean, there will always be a greater number of players within + or -X of that player on the side closest to the mean.
In simpler terms, its always more likely that Bonds is more average than his numbers suggest because there are many more "truly" average players out there than there are "truly" great players.
So we can't say that Bonds (to use your your example) is definitely not a "true" <.320 hitter. What we can say is that there is a greater chance that Bonds is a <.320 hitter than that he is an = or >.320 hitter.
Mark Prior and the Perfect Delivery (September 30, 2003)
Discussion ThreadPosted 2:44 a.m.,
October 5, 2003
(#5) -
Brad Wenban
We should remember that injuries are (presumably -- I'm no expert) caused by two factors: the stress placed on the arm and the susceptibility of the arm to stress.
The former is guagable by video and is a function of mechanics.
The latter is a "black box" determined by a complex mixture of genetics, upbringing, past stress, etc.
Luckily, science can address both of these issues. 1) Physics can teach us exactly how much force is created by certain motions. Medical science can develop tests to determine 2) a) the effect of various forces on the body generally and b) the exact fragility of a specific pitcher's body.
This leads me to a few questions: How far has the science come with regard to 1 and 2a, which are essential underpinnings of Will's comments?
With regard to 2b, are there any reliable tests for fragility yet employed beyond past injuries or direct observation of deformities (i.e. a muscle tear)? What exactly goes on in a baseball physical and is there substantial predictive power to the MD's observations?
Do we have any way to know that any given pitcher's injury is likely a result of 1 and not 2b? Is it possible that 2b is so important, or the stress reduction from perfect mechanics so small, or the range of stress imparted by the mechanics of those pitchers that are actually candidates for this analysis so similar (in other words, those with bad mechanics may be weeded out by injury in high school), that a mechanics based injury prediction system may fail?
FIP and DER (December 30, 2003)
Posted 2:02 a.m.,
December 31, 2003
(#1) -
Brad Wenban
From the article:
As a pitcher's FIP decreases, defense becomes less relevant to the overall outcome. Not negative, not positive. Just less relevant.
**********
So superior FIP pitchers are more valuable to a team with a worse defense and vice versa.
The moral from a team building point of view is that every increase in defensive quality ($H) makes an increase in pitching (FIP) quality relatively less valuable (since the run value of a BIP falls) but makes an increase in batting quality relatively more valuable (since Runs/Win falls). Similarly, every increase in pitching quality has the same impact, making an increase in defensive quality relatively less valuable but also making an increase in batting quality relatively more valuable.
Are these effects large enough to ever be functionally determinative in optimal player usage? For example, how would '03 Jeter's custom defensive LWts given his pitching staff differ from league average?
ARod and Soriano - Was the Trade Fair? (February 16, 2004)
Posted 2:15 a.m.,
March 1, 2004
(#43) -
Brad Wenban
Two points: First, you can partially avoid the difficult problem of calculating a given team's $/win function by how successful of a trade this was relative to the alternative uses of the money spent on ARod. So, a this could be a bad trade for the Yankees if (Best Alternative Player - Player Demoted) > (A-Rod + 2B promoted - Soriano - 3B demoted).
For the Rangers, the issue is more difficult because you would have to hypothesize other salary dumps (e.g. Park + Greer + Blaylock for nothing).
The problem with this is that the team could do both (get ARod and the Alternative Player, or dump ARod and other talent). Certain assumptions (like non-linearity of $/W) can be used to defeat this problem.
Second, should you apply a discount rate to future Runs, such that 10 runs now might be worth 1.07 runs a year from now? It seems irrational to assume without evidence a zero percent discount rate for the value of runs (growth in $/win exactly cancels out with the interest rate.
EconPapers: Steven Levitt (February 24, 2004)
Discussion ThreadPosted 1:50 a.m.,
March 1, 2004
(#10) -
Brad Wenban
Given that bookies can also bet, if a bookie sets the odds at some position other than the bookies' expected outcome, other bookies could make money by placing bets with that individual.
Every time bad bettors drive the odds from the good bettors' expected outcome, the good bettors should increase their betting activity to capitalize on this free money. Right?